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1. Introduction
"Politimetrics" (Gurr 1972), "polimetrics," (Alker 1975), "politometrics"
(Hilton 1976), "political arithmetic" (Petty [1672] 1971), "quantitative Politi-
cal Science (QPS)," "governmetrics," "posopolitics" (Papayanopoulos 1973),
"political science statistics" (Rai and Blydenburgh 1973), "political statistics"
(Rice 1926). These are some of the names that scholars have used to describe
the field we now call "political methodology."
1 The history of political meth-
odology has been quite fragmented until recently, as reflected by this patch-
work of names. The field has begun to coalesce during the past decade; we are
developing persistent organizations, a growing body of scholarly literature,
and an emerging consensus about important problems that need to be solved.
I make one main point in this article: If political methodology is to play
an important role in the future of political science, scholars will need to find
ways of representing more interesting political contexts in quantitative analy-
ses. This does not mean that scholars should just build more and more compli-
cated statistical models. Instead, we need to represent more of the essence of
political phenomena in our models. The advantage of formal and quantitative
approaches is that they are abstract representations of the political world and
are, thus, much clearer. We need methods that enable us to abstract the right
parts of the phenomenon we are studying and exclude everything superfluous.
This paper was presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Associa-
tion, Atlanta, Georgia. My thanks go to the section head, John Freeman, who convinced me to
write this paper, and the discussants on the panel, George Downs, John Jackson, Phil Schrodt,
and Jim Stimson, for many helpful comments. Thanks also to the National Science Foundation for
grant SES-89-09201, to Nancy Bums for research assistance, and to Neal Beck, Nancy Bums,
and Andrew Gclman for helpful discussions.
I. Johnson and Schrodt's 1989 paper gives an excellent sense of the breadth of formal and
quantitative political methods, a broad focus but still much narrower than the diverse collection of
methods routinely used in the discipline. For this paper, I narrow my definition of political
methodology even further to include only statistical methods.2 Political Analysis
Despite the fragmented history of quantitative political analysis, a ver-
sion of this goal has been voiced frequently by both quantitative researchers
and their critics (see sec. 2). However, while recognizing this shortcoming,
earlier scholars were not in the position to rectify it, lacking the mathematical
and statistical tools and, early on, the data. Since political methodologists
have made great progress in these and other areas in recent years, I argue that
we are now capable of realizing this goal. In section 3, 1 suggest specific
approaches to this problem. Finally, in section 4, I provide two modem
examples to illustrate these points.
2. A Brief History of Political Methodology
In this section, I describe five distinct stages in the history of political meth-
odology.
2 Each stage has contributed, and continues to contribute, to the
evolution of the subfield but has ultimately failed to bring sufficient political
detail into quantitative analyses. For the purpose of delineating these five
stages, I have collected data on every article published in the American
Political Science Review {APSR) from 1906 to 1988.
3 The APSR was neither
the first political science journal nor the first to publish an article using
quantitative methods, and it does not always contain the highest quality arti-
cles.
4 Nevertheless, APSR has consistently reflected the broadest cross-
section of the discipline and has usually been among the most visible political
science journals. Of the 2,529 articles published through 1988, 619, or 24.5
percent, used quantitative data and methods in some way.
At least four phases can be directly discerned from these data. I begin by
briefly describing these four stages and a fifth stage currently in progress. In
these accounts, I focus on the ways in which methodologists have attempted
2. Although these stages in the history of political methodology seem to emerge naturally
from the data I describe below, this punctuation of historical time is primarily useful for exposi-
tory purposes.
3. Not much of methodological note happened prior to 1906, even though the history of
quantitative analysis in the discipline dates at least to the origins of American political science a
century ago: "The Establishment of the Columbia School not only marked the beginnings of
political science in the U.S., but also the beginnings of statistics as an academic course, for it was
at that same time and place—Columbia University in 1880—that th'e first course in statistics was
offered in an American university. The course instructor was Richmond Mayo-Smith (1854-
1901) who, despite the lack of disciplinary boundaries at the time, can quite properly be called a
political scientist" (Gow 1985, 2). In fact, the history of quantitative analysis of political data
dates back at least two centuries earlier, right to the beginnings of the history of statistics (see
Stigler 1986; Petty, 1672).
4. Although quantitative articles on politics were published in other disciplines, the first
quantitative article on politics published in a political science journal was Ogbum and Coltra
1919.On Political Methodology
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Fig. 1. The growth of quantitative political science
to incorporate more political context in their analyses at each juncture, and the
limitations, imposed by both data and methods, to doing so effectively.
As figure 1 illustrates, political scientists first began using quantitative
analysis consistently during the 1920s. This marks the first essential stage in
the development of methodology. Clearly, one cannot make use of quantita-
tive methods without data to analyze, nor model politics without systematic
empirical evidence. Moreover, even before this time, scholars began to argue
that hypotheses about political phenomena could and should be verified. For
example, A. Lawrence Lowell wrote:
The main laboratory for the actual working of political institutions is not
a library, but the outside world of political life. It is there that the
phenomena must be sought. . . . Too often statements are repeated in
book after book without any serious attempt at verification. (1910, 7-8)
For the most part, the first quantitative political scientists relied on direct
empirical observation, as distinct from data collection. However, this proved
an inadequate means of organizing and understanding the "outside world of
political life." This sphere was simply too immense to study effectively with
direct observation. Thus, methodologists turned to systematic data collection,
a trend that gained considerable momentum during the 1920s. Charles Mer-
riam wrote, "Statistics increase the length and breadth of the observer's range,
giving him myriad eyes and making it possible to explore areas hitherto only4 Political Analysis
vaguely described and charted" (1921, 197). A fascinating statement about
these data collection efforts can be found in a series of sometimes breathless
reports by the "National Conference on the Science of Politics," instructing
political scientists to collect all manner of data, including campaign literature,
handbooks, party platforms in national, state, and local politics, election
statistics and laws, correspondence that legislators receive from their constitu-
encies, and many other items (see "Report" 1926, 137).
This new interest in data collection ultimately had two important conse-
quences: First, it greatly expanded the potential range of issues that political
scientists could address. Even today, political methodologists' most important
contributions have been in the area of data collection; even the 1CPSR was
founded by political scientists.
3 Additionally, the availability of data naturally
raised questions of how best to use it, the heart of political methodology.
Although the techniques were not fully understood and widely used until
many years later, political scientists first experimented with statistical tech-
niques during this early period, including correlation, regression, and factor
analysis (see Gow 1985).
Figure 1 also illustrates the second important phase in the evolution of
political methodology, the "behavioral revolution" of the late 1960s. During
this period, the use of quantitative methods increased dramatically. In only
five years, the proportion of articles in the APSR using quantitative data and
methods increased from under a quarter to over half. Behavioralists popu-
larized the idea of quantification, and applied it to many new substantive
areas.
Unfortunately, while the behavioralists played an important role in ex-
panding the scope of quantitative analysis, they also contributed to the view
that quantitative methods gave short shrift to political context. While innova-
tive in finding new applications, they generally relied on methods that had
been in use for decades (and still not adequately understood), applying them
5. Despite recent strides forward, much remains to be done. Consider one small example of
shortcomings in our data, an example relatively free of theoretical complications. Evidence on
incumbency advantage comes largely from two collections of aggregate election returns from
U.S. Senate and House elections, one from the ICPSR and one coded by scholars from Congres-
sional Quarterly. To analyze the issue of incumbency advantage properly, one needs the Demo-
cratic proportion of the two-party vote and the political party of the incumbent, if any, in each
district. I compared the two collections from 1946 to 1984 and compiled a list of all House
districts in which the vote proportions recorded by each differed by more than ten percent, or the
incumbency code was wrong. Over these twenty elections, the number of district errors was the
equivalent of nearly two full houses of Congress. Indeed, according to the ICPSR data, elections
for the U.S. Senate in 1980 were held in the wrong third of the American states! Either this is the
most important empirical rinding in many years, or we need to pay even closer attention to issues
of measurement. As Lowell once wrote, "Statistics, like veal pies, are good if you know the
person that made them, and are sure of the ingredients" (1910, 10).On Political Methodology
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Fig. 2. Collecting data and measuring concepts
over and over again to new, if sometimes narrow, substantive questions. Thus,
they encouraged the view that methods need not, or could not, be adapted to
the specific problem at hand.
Figure 2 illustrates the third phase in the development of political meth-
odology: increasing reliance on original data, rather than data automatically
generated by political processes. Examples of the latter include election and
roll call data. In contrast, concepts such as representation, power, and ideol-
ogy require more active and creative measurement processes. Figure 2 plots
the difference (smoothed via kernel density estimates) between articles that
used existing data published by government and business and those that used
more original data created by the author or other political scientists. Before
the 1960s, quantitative articles relied mostly on published data from govern-
ment or business (see Gosnell 1933). During the 1960s, one observes a small
change in the direction of greater reliance on original data. However, this
transition began in earnest during the mid-1970s, after which point almost
twice as many quantitative articles used original, rather than government,
data.
This sharp transition heralded an extremely important development in the
history of quantitative political science. Quantitative analysts were no longer
limited to areas of study for which data sets were routinely compiled. Equally
important, theoretical concepts were used in designing data collection efforts.
Thus, these data embodied political content that was previously quite difficult
to study by systematic means. The potential scope of analysis was againPolitical Analysis
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Fig. 3. New statistical methods in APSR articles
greatly expanded. For example, researchers used content analyses and event
counts to compile data in the field of international relations, enabling them to
consider such questions as the causes of war, the effects of military expendi-
tures on the deterrence or provocation of international conflict, and of the role
of specific reciprocity on the behavior of nations. Measures of variables such
as international conflict, power, deterrence, and reciprocity do not naturally
exist in the world, and, without the capability to create data, such questions
could not be addressed systematically.
6
The fourth development in the history of political methodology took
place in the late 1970s, with a dramatic increase in the importation of new
quantitative methods from other disciplines. Figure 3 graphs the cumulative
number of new statistical methods used in APSR.
1 However, these methods
were "new" only to political science. Virtually without exception, they were
developed by scholars in other disciplines.
6. In the 1960s and 1970s, quantitative scholars in international relations were fond of
saying that their field was like the discipline of economics in the 1950s, pausing to solve several
critical measurement issues before proceeding on to bigger theoretical questions. However, as
many came to realize, this was backward reasoning: The process of measuring difficult and
sophisticated concepts, like those in international relations, is not fundamentally easier, or even
different from, the theoretical process of deriving these concepts in the first place (see Eisner
1989).
7. Most of these methods were also new to political science, at least within one to two
years of publication in APSR.On Political Methodology 7
Borrowing from other disciplines is certainly not unique to methodology.
Indeed, some of the most influential theories of political science were adapted
from social psychology, economics, historical sociology, and elsewhere. The
practice of importing methods has both merits and drawbacks. Importing
methods provided a means of partially redressing the imbalance between our
data, rich in political context, and our methods, which were not sophisticated
enough to make full use of such information. For example, regression and
factor analysis were introduced into political science in 1935 (see Gosnell and
Gill 1935). More recently, some methods successfully imported to political
science include those that allow for endogeneity (Jackson 1975), autocorrela-
tion (Hibbs 1974) and selection bias (Achen 1986b), in regression models;
such procedures have proved extremely useful in models of voting behavior
and political economy, respectively. Weisberg (1974) "reimported" several
methods of scaling analysis in an intuitive and influential article, and Kritzer
(1978a and 1978b) introduced an easy-to-use method for coping with
categorical dependent variables within the familiar regression framework.
Scholars have also recently imported and developed sophisticated models of
time-series (Beck 1983 and 1987; Freeman 1983 and 1989) and pooled time-
series cross-sectional data (Stimson 1985), among many others.
However, precisely because they are adopted from other disciplines with-
out substantial modification or adaptation, imported methods are sometimes
ill-suited to extract all useful information from political data. An interesting
example of the common problems with importing statistical methods—one of
the first attempts—can be found in Rice (1926). Because his methods were so
simple, the problems with imported method in this instance are transparent.
Rice analyzed votes for LaFollette in midwestem states with a view to deter-
mining how attitudes and opinions diffuse. Among other things, he wished to
know whether "political boundaries interpose little or no obstacle" to this
diffusion. He studied this question with the method of data summaries. He
used averages and standard deviations, and was especially concerned with
fitting a Normal distribution to his electoral data. The latter was a practice
then common among many scientists who appeared to have found evidence
that "many human characteristics are distributed normally" (Rice 1926, 316—
17).
8 Fitting the Normal distribution across counties in eight midwestem
states does show how the mean and variance are interesting summary statis-
tics, in that they conveniently describe LaFollette sentiment.
9 Unfortunately,
8. It turned out later that the statistical tests used to decide whether observed variables are
distributed Normally were not very powerful. When more powerful tests were developed,
scholars found extremely few examples of naturally occurring, Normally distributed variables in
political science or anywhere else.
9. In modem terminology, the mean and variance are sufficient statistics for a Normal
distribution.8 Political Analysis
the Normal fit itself bears virtually no relationship to the interesting political
questions Rice posed, and made extremely poor use of the detailed, county-
level data he obtained.
In fact, the simple method of summarizing county-level data with state-
wide averages does provide some information with which to answer his inter-
esting question, even if he did not notice this at the time. For example, Rice
reports that Wisconsin counties gave LaFollette an average 54.3 percent of
their votes (in part because LaFollette was a Favorite Son), whereas counties
in the neighboring state of Minnesota gave him only 45.0 percent average
support. A small test of Rice's question, with the data he reported, can be
conducted by asking whether Minnesota's support is as high as 45.0 percent
because it is next to Wisconsin, or because it contained voters with similar
characteristics. The answer is uncertain, but his data do indicate that the
cross-border diffusion effects he hypothesizes are not enormous: Iowa, also
Wisconsin's neighbor, supported LaFollette only 28.5 percent on average, a
figure lower than all but one of the other states in his sample. Had Rice
focused more on studying the substance of his substantive questions, as he is
otherwise famous for, he would never have wasted space on the Normal fit
part of his method; at the same time, he could have focused on the other, more
interesting, summary statistics enabling him to partially answer the questions
he posed. This example illustrates some of the problems with imported tech-
niques. Methodologies are not always universally applicable; they must be
adapted to specific contexts and issues if data are to be put to good use.
In combination, the dramatic developments in original data collection
and innovative methodology after the 1960s paint a particularly bleak picture
of the behavioral revolution. During the 1960s, very little original data ap-
peared in political science, and the learning curve of new methods in figure 3
was almost completely flat. Indeed, this was probably one of the reasons why
behavioralism was so unpopular among nonquantitative researchers: Most
scholars were merely applying the same methods over and over again to new
areas with relatively unoriginal data, rather than developing new statistical
procedures for each of the areas into which quantitative analysis was ex-
tended. Their relatively simple statistical methods guaranteed that the behav-
ioralists could only rarely claim to have learned something about politics that
could not have been learned without quantitative data. In addition, since the
methods were not specially adapted for each research problem, quantification
was often less than a major improvement over more traditional approaches
and often looked as silly as the critics claimed. Of course, this should take
away little from the critical role behavioralism played in introducing quantita-
tive analysis to many new parts of the discipline.
In addition to these four developments in political methodology—dataOn Political Methodology 9
collection (1920s), the growth of quantitative methods (late 1960s), measur-
ing concepts (mid-1970s), and importing statistical techniques (late 1970s)—
a fifth important development, not well represented in APSR data, is currently
underway. In the 1980s, political methodologists have begun to solve meth-
odological problems explicitly, evaluating and improving existing ad hoc
methods of measurement, and—still too rarely—inventing new statistical
methods and estimators.
This development is largely the consequence of two publications: Hanu-
shek and Jackson's (1977) textbook, which helped to enhance the level of
mathematical and statistical preparedness in the discipline, and Achen's 1983
paper, which convinced many that imported statistical techniques should no
longer dominate political methodology. Through the explication of two impor-
tant political science problems—ecological inference and measurement
error—Achen argued that we need to solve methodological problems indige-
nously. He encouraged methodologists to prove consistency theorems, derive
confidence intervals, invent new estimators, and to be as generally creative as
are other areas in political science and the methodological subfields of other
disciplines.
Much recent work in methodology is directed toward these issues, begin-
ning with Achen's own work demonstrating bias in "normal vote" estimates
(1977). Beck (1986) showed how one can leam about political substance by
modeling time-series processes, rather than considering these processes to be
merely an estimation nuisance. Franklin (1989) proved consistency results for
his "2SAIV" procedure, enabling one to estimate a regression with variables
from different, independent sample surveys. Bartels (1989) derived the bias in
misspecified instrumental variables models. Rivers (1988) demonstrated the
bias in models of voter behavior that ignore heterogeneity of voter prefer-
ences, and Jackson (1989) derived estimators for survey data that deal effec-
tively with small area characteristics. King demonstrated the bias and incon-
sistency in the way event counts have been analyzed (1988), the inefficiencies
that results when representation is measured with "uniform partisan swing"
(1989a), and the bias in previous measures of incumbency advantage (King
and Gelman 1991), in addition to creating improved estimators in each case.
3. The Future of Political Methodology
I have recounted the enormous progress political methodologists have made in
collecting original data and developing methods. What remains to be done?
Clearly, we have not exhausted all the possibilities in these areas; vast areas of
empirical work remain unexplored by sophisticated methodological analysis,
particularly in the areas of comparative politics and international relations.10 Political Analysis
Numerous potentially useful techniques developed elsewhere have gone un-
noticed in political science, and many interesting data sets remain to be
collected. Work in these areas should obviously continue.
But what is the next logical step in the development of this subfield? 1
believe the answer to this question lies in our critics' complaint that political
substance and quantitative analysis are incompatible. Obviously, few meth-
odologists accept this proposition, but there is a kernel of truth in it, judging
from the history of methodology: We have not done enough to integrate
context in quantitative analyses. The purpose of each of the five stages delin-
eated in the previous section was to incorporate more political substance into
quantitative analyses, but these developments, even taken together, are still
insufficient. Nevertheless, I believe the goal can be accomplished by making
three related changes:
First, we need to relate methods more consistently and explicitly to
theories of statistical inference. I have advocated the likelihood theory of
inference (King 1989b), but some other approaches work well in special
cases. A focus on inference will help us to distinguish models from data, and
theoretical ideas from data, more clearly. Most important, statistical analyses
based on well-developed theories of statistical inference can bridge the gap
between theories of politics and quantitative analyses, enabling us to test
theories empirically and to build upward from the data to theory. This would
make political theories more generally relevant to the empirical world, and
quantitative methods a more useful and integral part of political science.
Of course, statistical inference per se is not a panacea, and approaches
based on such theories must be carefully applied. We have not always been as
conscientious as we should in this regard. For example, consistency is the
notion that, as the sample size tends to infinity, the sampling distribution of
the estimator will collapse to a spike over the population parameter. It is a
very popular and useful statistical criterion, which makes a great deal of sense
when applied to data collected from sample surveys with replacement, for
example. However, political methodologists have applied the consistency
criterion to time-series data as well. Logically speaking, this means that we
would have to wait until the end of time for the estimator to converge to the
parameter, a nonsensical argument.
For another example, consider what consistency means if the analysis is
based on geography, like a county in the United States. The number of
counties going to infinity could mean that the landmass and number of people
in the United States is increasing, but this could happen only with either a new
wave of colonial domination or an expanding earth. Alternatively, we could
assume that the landmass and number of people stays constant, but more
counties means that fewer and fewer people are in each county. The conse-
quence of consistency here is that, at the limit (one person per county), allOn Political Methodology 11
aggregation bias is eliminated. Other statistical criteria have their problems as
well, and many conflict in practice, so I am not arguing that we drop consis-
tency in particular. Clearly, we need to have open discussions of these issues
and come to a consensus about which statistical criteria make sense in relation
to specific substantive issues.
Along the same lines, I propose a new statistical criterion that we should
consider as important as any of the more usual ones. We should ask of every
new estimator: "What did it do to the data?" Statistical criteria such as consis-
tency, unbiasedness, minimum mean square error, admissibility, etc., are all
very important, particularly since, like economists (but unlike many statisti-
cians), we tend to conceptualize our models as existing independently of the
data we happen to use for estimation. However, in the end, statistical analyses
never involve more than taking a lot of numbers and summarizing them with a
few numbers. Knowing that one's procedures meet some desirable statistical
criterion is comforting but insufficient. We must also fully understand (and
communicate) just what was done to the data to produce the statistics we
report. In part, this is just another call for full reporting of statistical pro-
cedures, but it is also a suggestion that we hold off using even those statistical
procedures that meet the usual statistical criteria until we can show precisely
and intuitively how the data are summarized. Developing estimators that are
robust, adaptive, nonparametric, semiparametric, distribution free, hetero-
skedasticity-consistent, or otherwise unrestrictive is important, but until we
clarify just what estimators like these do to our data, they are not worth using.
Deriving estimators from a well-known theory of inference will help in this
regard, as will the diffusion of more sophisticated mathematical and statistical
background.
Second, we require more powerful statistics and mathematics to build
full probabilistic models of the processes giving rise to political phenomena.
Probabilistic models enable one to represent more relevant political substance
in statistical models and are required by most theories of inference.
1
0
Of course, critics claim that technical work forces out political sub-
stance, but this is precisely incorrect. Instead, the reason much quantitative
political science appears so apolitical is that the relatively simple statistical
procedures that are often used are incapable of representing much of the
interesting political detail. The result is that many quantitative publications
either have little political substance at all, or they have substance, but only in
qualitative analyses that are not part of their statistical models. In either case,
10. For likelihood, the full probabilistic structure is used to derive parameter estimates. For
methods of moments and others, only the mean and covariance matrix are used, but these
moments are usually calculated from the complete probabilistic model. Bayesian inference re-
quires all the probabilistic assumptions of a likelihood model and others to represent prior
knowledge or beliefs.12 Political Analysis
the statistical analyses look superfluous to the goals of the discipline. With
more sophisticated statistics and mathematics, we would be able to fine-tune
our models to the unusual data and theories developed in the discipline.
Others argue against more sophisticated statistical analyses because data
in political science do not meet the usual sets of statistical assumptions, but
this is also completely backward. Simple statistical techniques are useful only
with data of the highest quality and unambiguous content. Only with sophisti-
cated methods will we be able to generate adequate probabilistic models of the
complicated political processes giving rise to our quantitative data.
Finally, when we encounter problems for which the requisite statistical
methods to incorporate all relevant political information do not yet exist, we
should portray this information with descriptive statistics and graphics. De-
scriptive statistics as simple as sample means, standard deviations, and cross-
tabulations are absent from many published works; yet, they can greatly
clarify and extract useful information in quantitative data.''
Although they will clearly conflict at times, (a) closer attention to theo-
ries of inference; (b) more sophisticated stochastic modeling; and, (c) more
descriptive statistics and graphics are different ways of incorporating more
political substance into quantitative analyses. The gap between quantitative
and qualitative scholars that is present in many departments is unlikely to be
bridged without these and other steps designed for the same purpose. I turn
now to an example of these points in the analysis of aggregate data.
4. Aggregate Data
Virtually every subfield of political science has aggregate data of some kind,
and most have analyzed them in some way. For example, scholars in Ameri-
can and comparative politics study electoral data and the consequences of
electoral laws; in comparative politics and international relations, scholars
compare nations and interactions among nations with data measured at the
level of the nation-state; in international political economy, researchers seek
to explain variations in indicators of the health of national economies.
The two subsections that follow illustrate the points emphasized above.
In section 4.1, I give an example of a complete stochastic model of an
important class of substantive problems—the process by which data are ag-
gregated. This model may provide much of the solution to the ecological
inference problem. Section 4.2 introduces the problem of spatial variation and
correlation. This is an example of a set of political processes that have been
11. Indeed, one of the leaders in statistical graphics is a political methodologist, and his
work should be incorporated more into statistical practice; see Tufte 1983; also see Cleveland
1985.On Political Methodology 13
insufficiently studied in political science, but for which existing statistical
models are wholly inadequate. Ultimately, probabilistic modeling is necessary
to fully analyze such processes effectively. In the interim, graphical ap-
proaches can be extremely useful, as described below.
4.1. Ecological Inference
In this section, I describe one way to model the aggregation process with a
complete stochastic model. I believe this model (in terms of internal consis-
tency) goes very far toward solving the chief problems with ecological in-
ference: avoiding aggregation bias and producing realistic standard errors.
Other problems such as latent variables may still remain (Achen 1983).
First, for contrast, I present the usual approach first suggested by Leo
Goodman (1953). The goal is to consistently estimate the proportion of Dem-
ocratic voters at time 1 who vote Democratic at time 2 (P) and the proportion
of Republican voters at time 1 who vote Democratic at time 2 (Q), with only
aggregate data. We observe Dlt the fraction of Democratic votes at time 1,
and D2, the fraction at time 2. The following is true by definition:
D2 = PD, + Q{\ - Dx) (1)
Across districts, this equation is only true if P and Q are constant. If they are
not, one might think that this equation could be estimated by adding an error
term,
D2 = Q + (P - 0D, + e, (2)
and running a linear regression. However, an error term tacked on to the end
of an accounting identity does not make a proper probabilistic model of any
phenomenon. One can justify some of this procedure, in part, and fix some of
the (implicit) problematic assumptions in various ways, but the result is a
patchwork rather than a coherent model of the aggregation process. Unfortu-
nately, this is also an approach that frequently yields nonsensical results in
practice, such as estimated probabilities greater than one or less than zero. It
also gives unrealistic assessments of the uncertainty with which the parame-
ters are estimated.
Many scholars have written about this classic problem, and I refer
readers to Achen (1981, 1983, 1986a) and Shively (1969) for the latest
contributions and reviews of the literature. The key feature of the model I
present below is the comprehensive probabilistic framework, enabling one to14 Political Analysis
TABLE 1. A Contingency Table
Time 1
Vote
Dem
Rep
Time 2 Vote
Dem
Yf
rf
Y
Rep
nf - Yf
*,» - Yf
nj-Yj
"J
"f
"y
bring in as much of the substance of this research problem as possible. I begin
with individual voters, make plausible assumptions, and aggregate up to
derive a probability distribution for the observed marginals in table 1. This
probability distribution will be a function of parameters of the process giving
rise to the data. Brown and Payne (1986) have presented a more general form
of the model discussed below, an important special case of which was intro-
duced by McCue and Lupia (1989); Alt and King (n.d.) explicate the Brown
and Payne model, derive an even more general form, provide empirical exam-
ples, and offer an easy-to-use computer program.
The object of the analysis is portrayed in table 1. The table portrays a
very simple contingency table for voting at two times. As with aggregate data,
the total number of Democratic and Republican voters at each time are ob-
served: Yj, (n.j — Yj), nf, and nf. The object of the analysis is to find
something out about the cells of the table that remain unobserved. At time 2,
nf and nf are observed and assumed fixed. Thus, the only randomness we
must model is that leading to the realized values of YJt conditional on the time
1 marginals. The loyalists Yf (the number of Democrats at time 1 voting
Democratic at time 2) and the defectors Yf (the number of Republicans at
time 1 voting Democratic at time 2) are the object of this inference problem.
Begin by letting the random variable Yfj equal 1 for a Democratic vote at
time 2, and 0 otherwise, for individual i (/ = 1, .... nf), district; (y =
1, . . . , J), and time 1 vote for Party P (P = [D.R ]). Then define Pr(y£ = 1)
= irfj as the probability of this individual voting Democratic at time 2 (that is,
the probability of being a loyalist iff = D or defector if P = /?). By assuming
that, at time 2, the Democratic versus Republican vote choice is mutually
exclusive and exhaustive, we have the result that Y? is a Bernoulli random
variable with parameter TT£ for each individual. This is an almost completely
unrestrictive model of individuals, as virtually all of its assumptions are easily
relaxed (see Alt and King n.d.).
1 now aggregate individuals in two stages. First, 1 aggregate these unob-On Political Methodology 15
served individual probabilities within districts to get the (also unobserved)
cells of the contingency table; afterward I aggregate to get the marginal
random variable YJf the realization of which is observed in each district. To
begin, let Yf = l/nf 2I=I Yy. To get a probabilistic model for Yf, we must
combine our model for each Y» and some assumptions about the aggregation
process. One possibility is to assume (1) homogeneity, that every individual i
(in district j voting for party P at time 1) has the same probability of voting for
the Democrats at time 2 (TTJ), and (2) independence, individual vote decisions
within a district are independent of one another. If these (implausible) as-
sumptions hold, the variable Yf has a binomial distribution (in the language of
introductory statistics texts, Yj "successes" out of nf independent trials, each
with probability irf): feiyfWf'^)-
Since these aggregation assumptions are implausible, we generalize
these by letting ir
p. be randomly distributed across individuals within district j
according to a beta distribution, fp(irf\n?,a
p), with mean£(7r?) = Il^and
dispersion parameter a
p. The beta distribution is a mathematical conve-
nience, but it is also very flexible; other choices would give very similar
empirical results. Furthermore, because dependence and contagion among
individuals are not identified in aggregate data, adding this assumption fixes
both implausible assumptions generating the binomial distribution. To com-
bine the binomial with the beta assumption, we calculate the joint distribution
of Yf and vf and then average over the randomness in ttf within district j and
for a time 1 vote for Party P. The result is the beta-binomial distribution (see
King 1989b, chap. 3 for details of this derivation):
In this distribution, the mean 'isE(irf) = IIf, and the dispersion around this
mean is indexed by a
p. If the individual cells of the contingency table were
observed, this would be a very plausible model one might use to estimate the
district transition probabilities Hf, a more general one than the usual log-
linear model. When a
p —* 1, the assumptions of homogeneity and indepen-
dence hold so that this beta-binomial distribution converges to a binomial
distribution.
Since only the margins are usually observed in table 1, we need to
aggregate one further step: Yj = Yf + YJ. Since we now have a probability
model for the each term on the right side of this expression, we need only one
assumption to get the distribution for the marginal total, Yj. The assumption I
use is that, conditional on the parameters (IIP, Uf,a
D,a
R) and the time 116 Political Analysis
marginals that are known at time 2 (nP.nf), YP and Yf are independent for
all districts/
1
2 The result is an aggregated beta-binomial distribution:
(4)
This probability distribution is a model of the randomness in the time 2
marginal total Yjt conditional on the time 1 marginals, nj> and n* The
distribution is a function of four very interesting parameters that can be
estimated: (1) the average probability in district j of time 1 Democrats voting
Democratic at time 2, TIP; (2) individuals' variation around this average, a
D;
(3) average probability in district y of time 1 Republicans voting Democratic at
time 2, II*; and (4) individuals' variation around this average, a
R.
If we were to regard the transition probabilities as constant, we could just
drop the subscript y and use equation 4 as the likelihood function for observa-
tion y. Alternatively, we can let IIP and FlJ vary over the districts as logistic
functions of measured explanatory variables:
Ylf = [1 + exp(-X,/3)]-' (5)
n* = [1 + exp(-Z,y)]-'
Where X and Z are vectors of (possibility different) explanatory variables, and
/3 and y are the effects of X and Z, respectively, on IIP and II*. Thus, even
though one does not observe these loyalty and defection rates directly, one
could use this model to study many interesting questions. For example, with
only aggregate data, we can discover whether people are more loyal to their
parties in open seats than in districts with incumbent candidates.
Since we have a full stochastic model, estimation is straightforward. We
merely form the likelihood function by taking the product of equation 4 over
they districts and substituting in equations 5. One can then get the maximum
likelihood estimates by taking logs and maximizing the function with respect
to f3, y, a
D, and a
R, given the data. Alternatively, one can calculate the mean
and covariance matrix from this distribution and use the method of moments
to estimate the same parameters.
The advantage of this approach is that much more of the substance of the
research problem is modeled. One is not only able to infer the unobserved
12. This assumption only requires that the probabilities be sufficiently parametrized. Anal-
ogously, in regression models, the correct explanatory variables can whiten the disturbances.On Political Methodology 17
transition probabilities, but, perhaps even more significantly, we can also
study the variation in these probabilities across people within districts. Even
the cost of not knowing the cell frequencies (the move from the beta-binomial
to the aggregated beta-binomial) is made very clear by this approach because
it is an explicit part of the modeling process. Perhaps the biggest advantage
over previous approaches is that this full probabilistic model should produce
more reasonable estimates of uncertainty. This approach requires more so-
phisticated mathematics than usual. We require considerable empirical testing
before recommending its general application. Indeed, once the mathemat-
ics are fully understood, interpreting results from this model in terms of
inferences to individual-level parameters will be considerably easier than
approaches that are farther from the substantive process generating aggregated
data.
1
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4.2. Spatial Variation and Spatial Autocorrelation
The processes generating spatial variation and spatial autocorrelation begin
where the model of ecological inference in section 4.1 leaves off. These
models apply to two types of data. The first are ecological data, where the
object of inference is still the unobserved individual data. Scholars who write
about ecological inference usually argue that this is the object of analysis for
virtually all aggregate data. However, a second type of data is relatively
common outside of American politics—data which are most natural at the
level of the aggregate. For example, national economic statistics or measures
of the degree to which a nation is democratic or representative of its people do
not apply well to anything but the aggregate unit. Spatial variation and auto-
correlation models apply to both types of data, but I focus here only on the
second type to simplify matters.
Political scientists have collected enormous quantities of aggregate data
organized by location. The local or regional component is recognized, if not
adequately analyzed, in most of these data. But we forget that even sample
survey data have areal components. For example, the 1980 American National
Election Study samples only from within 108 congressional districts. Yet,
most standard models using these data ignore this feature, implicitly assuming
that the same model holds within each and every congressional district.
Most other subfields of political science also pay sufficient attention to
the spatial features of their data. For purposes of analysis, we often assume all
districts (or countries, or regions) are independent, even though this is almost
certainly incorrect. Perhaps even more problematic, we do not sufficiently
13. Once the mathematics are understood, the approach also meets my what-did-you-do-
to-those-data criterion, since the stochastic model is quite clear.18 Political Analysis
explore spatial patterns in our data. Although maps of political relationships
(usually with variables represented by shading) were once relatively common
in American politics, for example, they are now almost entirely missing from
this literature. Think of how much political information was represented in the
classic maps in Southern Politics, for example, where V. O. Key (1949)
graphically portrayed the relationships between racial voting and the propor-
tion blacks. Key also showed spatial relationships by circling groups of points
in scatter plots to refer to specific geographic areas.
1
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Statistical models have been developed to deal with both spatial variation
and spatial autocorrelation, but these models are very inadequate to the task of
extracting contextual political information from geographic data—far more
inadequate than in other areas of statistical analysis. For example, compare
the parameter estimates and standard errors from a time-series analysis to the
original data: a plot over time of the complete original data may show a few
years (say) that are especially large outliers. A similar comparison for spatial
data is usually far different: One can plot residuals on a map and find a rich
variety of geographic patterns, which may, in turn, suggest numerous other
causes and relationships in the data (see Jackson 1990).
All this suggests two critical tasks for political methodologists: (1) we
should find ways to improve existing statistical models along these lines, and
(2) in the interim and perhaps indefinitely, we need to encourage much more
attention to mapping and other similar graphical images. Although one could
not emphasize the latter enough, I will spend the remainder of the this section
focusing on the inadequacy of statistical models of geographic data.
1 first describe models of spatial variation, and then tum to models of
spatial autocorrelation. In both cases, I discuss only linear-Normal models. I
do this for simplicity of presentation, not because these are more generally
appropriate than any other functional form or distributional assumption.
Spatial Variation
Spatial variation is what we usually think of when we consider the special
features of geographic data. Take, for example, the linear regression model
where the unit of analysis is a geographic unit:
E(Y) = y. = X/3 = p0 + /3,X, + p2X2 . . . (3kXk (6)
14. If one were to argue that a classic book like V. O. Key's might just be the exception,
consider Dahl's Who Governs? (1961). Another classic, but without a single map. Dahl could
have even more vividly portrayed the nature of politics in this city by showing exactly where each
of the wards he described was located, where the city hall was, and where each of the key actors
lived. He does have a few graphs with wards distinguished, but without a map this political
context in his quantitative data is lost. (Obviously, the book hardly needs more in the way of
political context, but I am focusing only on the degree to which he showed the political context in
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If /x is the expected degree of political freedom in a country, then X can
include regional variables or attributes of the countries in the sample. A plot
of the fitted values and residuals on a map of the world would give one a good
sense of how well this model was representing the political question at hand.
In a model like this, estimates of the effect parameters, /3, are unlikely to
provide as much substantive information.
A generalization of this model that takes into account some more of the
geographical information was proposed by Brown and Jones (1985). Their
idea (sometimes called "the expansion method"; see Anselin 1988) was to
take one or more of the effect parameters (say /3,) and to suppose that it is not
constant over the entire map. They let it vary smoothly as a quadratic interac-
tion of north-south and east-west directions:
where x and y are Cartesian coordinates (not independent and dependent
variables). One can then substitute this equation for /3, in equation 6 to
estimate /}, and y0, . . . , y5. Finally, we can portray the results by plotting
the estimated values of /3, as a continuous function over a map; this can take
the form of a contour plot, a three-dimensional density plot, or just appropri-
ate shading.
. This model will obviously give one a good sense of where the effect of
X, is largest, but for any interesting political analysis, equation 7 is a vast
oversimplification. Why should the effect of X, vary exactly (or even approxi-
mately) as a two-dimensional quadratic? The model also ignores political
boundaries and cannot cope with other discontinuous geographic changes in
the effect parameter.
A switching regression approach can model discontinuous change, but
only if the number of such changes are known a priori, an unlikely situation
(Brueckner 1986). One could also apply random coefficient models or other
approaches, but these are also unlikely to represent a very large proportion of
the spatial information in the typical set of quantitative political data.
Spatial Autocorrelation
Spatial autocorrelation—where neighboring geographic areas influence each
other—is an even more difficult problem than modeling spatial variation. To
get a sense of the problem, begin with the set of models for time-series
processes. Some of the enormous variety of time-series models can be found
in Harvey 1981. In political science, Beck (1987) showed that one of
the highest quality time-series in the discipline—presidential approval—
provided insufficient evidence with which to distinguish among most substan-
tively interesting time-series models. Freeman (1989) complicated matters
even further when he demonstrated that the aggregation of one time-series20 Political Analysis
process can be an entirely different process. Now imagine how much more
complicated these standard models would be if time travel were possible and
common. This is basically the problem of spatial autocorrelation.
Geographers have tried to narrow this range of possible models some-
what with what Tobler (1979) called the first law of geography: "everything is
related to everything else, but near things are more related than distant
things." Unfortunately, in political science, even this "law" does not always
hold. For example, although regional effects in international conflict are im-
portant, the Soviet Union probably has more of an effect on U.S. foreign
policy than Canada does. Similarly, New York probably takes the lead on state
policy from California more frequently than from Kansas.
Virtually all models of spatial autocorrelation make use of the concept of
a spatial lag operator, denoted W. W is an n x n matrix of weights fixed a
priori. The i, j element of W is set proportional to the influence of observation
/ on observation,/, with diagonal elements set to zero, and rows and columns
summing to one; thus, the matrix need not be symmetric if influence struc-
tures are asymmetric.
A simple version of the W matrix is coded zero for all noncontiguous,
and l/c, for contiguous, regions (where c, is the number of regions contiguous
to region /). Then multiplying W into a column vector produces the average
value of that vector for the contiguous regions. For example, if y is a (50 x 1)
vector containing U.S. state-level per capita income figures, then Wy is also a
(50 x 1) vector, the first element of which is the average per capita income for
all states contiguous to state 1.
Numerous models have been proposed for spatial processes, but virtually
all are functions of what I call the spatial fundamentals: (1) explanatory
variables, (2) spatially lagged dependent variables, (3) spatially lagged
shocks, and additional spatial lags of each of these.
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explanatory variables are portrayed in equation 6. We can add a spatial lag of
the dependent variable as follows:
E(Y,\yj,Vi *j)=Xi0 + pW,y (8)
Note that this is expressed as a conditional expectation, where the dependent
variable for region i is conditional on its values in all other regions. The
second term on the right side of this equation includes the spatial lag of the
dependent variable for region i (W, is the first row of the W matrix). The idea
behind this model is that the lagged dependent variable in some geographic
areas (say racially polarized voting) may influence the expected value in
others.
IS. This presentation is the spatial analogy to the categorization of time-series models in
King 1989b. chap. 7.On Political Methodology 21
Another way to think about this model is to consider the unconditional
expectation. In time-series models, the conditional and unconditional repre-
sentations are mathematically equivalent because the random variables for all
times before the present are already realized and thus known. In spatial
models, variable y on the right side of the equation is known only because of
the conditional expectation.
To write the unconditional expectation of equation 8, we merely take the
expected value of both sides of this equation and recursively reparameterize:
£ (£ (K, | y,,Vj */))= X, 0 + pW,.£ (y) (9)
y,.) = X,fi + pW,[X,fi + pW,E(y))
lX,) + P
2W}E(y)
Pp(W,X,) + p
2W}E(y)]
where we use the notation Wfy for row / of the matrix WWy. This uncondi-
tional form also provides a very interesting substantive interpretation for the
model since the expected value of Y(- is written as a geometric distributed
spatial lag of explanatory variables. Thus, the first term is the effect of X, on
£( Yj) (e.g., the effect of the proportion of blacks on racial polarization). The
second term is the effect of the average values of the explanatory variables in
regions contiguous to i on the dependent variable in ;, after controlling for the
explanatory variables in region /. (For example, racially polarized voting
might be affected by the separate influences of the proportion of blacks in a
county and in the neighboring counties; if 0 < p < 1, the effect of blacks in
contiguous counties would be smaller than the effect in the same county.) The
third term in the equation represents the effects of the explanatory variables in
regions two steps away—in regions contiguous to the regions that are con-
tiguous to the current region. Each additional term represents the effects of the
explanatory variables in regions farther and farther away. In this model, an
explanatory variable measured in region i has a direct affect on the dependent
variable in region /' and, through region i, has an affect on the next region, and
so on.
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16. This model can be easily estimated with maximum likelihood methods. If Y is dis-
tributed Normally, the likelihood function is proportional to a Normal distribution with mean
(/ - pW)->Xf) (another parameterization of the unconditional expected value) and variance22 Political Analysis
Alternatively, we can write a different conditional model with explana-
tory variables and spatially lagged random shocks as follows:
E(*,\VjXJ *i)=X,p+ PWie, (10)
Note how this model compares to the conditional model in equation 8. Both
are linear functions of a vector of explanatory variables. In addition, instead
of neighboring values of the dependent variable affecting the current depen-
dent variable, this model assumes that random shocks (unexpected values of
the dependent variable) in neighboring regions affect a region. For example, a
reasonable hypothesis is that, after taking into account the explanatory vari-
ables, only unexpected levels of international conflict in neighboring countries
will produce conflict in one's own country (see Doreian 1980).
The unconditional version of this model takes a surprisingly simple form:
£(£( y,|y,,V/ * i)) = X,)3 + pWf£(eI) (11)
What this means is that values of the explanatory variables have effects only in
the region for which they are measured. Unlike the first model in equations 8
(the conditional version) and 9 (the unconditional version), the explanatory
variables do not have effects that lop over into contiguous regions in this
second model in equations 10 (the conditional version) and 11 (the uncondi-
tional version). Only unexpected, or random, shocks affect the neighboring
region. Once these shocks affect the neighboring region, however, they disap-
pear; no "second-order" effects occur where something happens in one
county, which affects the next county, which affects the next, etc.
A more sophisticated model includes all three spatial fundamentals in the
same model (see Brandsma and Ketallapper 1978; Ooreian 1982; and Dow
1984; on the "biparametric" approach):
EiY^YjXj + i) = Xrf + PlWuy + p2W2le. (12)
This model incorporates many interesting special cases, including the pre-
vious models, but it is still wholly inadequate to represent the enormous
variety of conceivable spatial processes. For example, I have never seen a
single model estimated with social science data with more than these twoOn Political Methodology 23
spatial parameters (p, and ft) or a model with more than one conditional
spatial lag.
Another difficulty is the very definition of the spatial lag operator. How
does one define the "distance" between irregularly shaped spatial units? If
"distance" is to mean actual mileage between pairs of U.S. states, should the
measure be calculated between capital cities, largest cities, closest borders, or
just 0/1 variables indicating neighborhoods (Cressie and Chan 1989)? More
generally, we can also use more substantively meaningful definitions of dis-
tance, such as the proportion of shared common borders, numbers of commu-
ters traveling daily (or migrating permanently) between pairs of states, or
combinations of these or other measures (see Cliff and Ord 1973 and 1981).
Choosing the appropriate representation is obviously difficult, and the choice
makes an important difference in practice (Stetzer 1982). These concerns are
also important because unmodeled spatial variation will incorrectly appear to
the analyst as spatial autocorrelation.
However, a much more serious problem is that the W matrix is not a
unique representation of the spatial processes it models. This is not the usual
problem of fitting a model to empirical data. It is the additional problem of
fitting the model to the theoretical spatial process. For example, begin with a
spatial process, and represent it with a matrix W. The problem is that one
cannot reconstruct the identical map from this matrix. Since the W matrix (and
X) is the only way spatially distributed political variables are represented in
these models, this nonuniqueness is a fundamental problem. In order to get
more politics into this class of models, we need to develop better, more
sophisticated models and probably some other way to represent spatial infor-
mation.
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Through all of these models, the same problem remains: statistical mod-
els of spatial data do not represent enough of the political substance existing in
the data. I do not have a solution to this problem, but one possibility may lie in
a literature now forming on the statistical theory of shape (see Kendall 1989
for a review). The motivation behind this literature is often archaeological or
biological; for example, scholars sometimes want to know, apart from random
error, if two skulls are from the same species. In this form, the literature has
little to contribute to our endeavors (although political scientists are some-
times interested in shape alone; see Niemi et al. 1989). However, these
scholars are working on ways of representing shapes in statistical models, and
17. Many other approaches have been suggested for these models. For example, Arora and
Brown (1977) suggest, but do not estimate, a variety of more traditional approaches. Burridge
(1981) demonstrates how to test for a common factor in spatial models: the purpose of this is to
reduce the parametrization (just as Hendry and Mizon [1978] do in time-series models). For a
comprehensive review of many models, see Anselin 1988 from a linear econometric viewpoint
and Besag 1974 from a statistical perspective.24 Political Analysis
geographic shapes are just two-dimensional special cases of their models.
Eventually, some kind of spatially continuous model that includes the shape of
geographic areas along with information about continuous population den-
sities across these areas may help to represent more politics in these statistical
models. Until then, graphical approaches may be the only reasonable
option.
1
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5. Concluding Remarks
Although the quantitative analysis of political data is probably older than the
discipline of political science, the systematic and self-conscious study of
political methodology began much more recently. In this article, I have argued
for a theme that has pervaded the history of quantitative political science and
the critics of this movement: In a word, the future of political methodology is
in taking our critics seriously and finding ways to bring more politics into our
quantitative analyses.
My suggestions for including more political context include using more
sophisticated stochastic modeling; understanding and developing our own
approach to, and perspectives on, theories of inference; and developing and
using graphic analysis more often. I believe these are most important, but
other approaches may turn out to be critical as well. For example, the proba-
bilistic models I favor usually begin with assumptions about individual be-
havior, and this is precisely the area where formal modelers have the most
experience. If our stochastic models are to be related in meaningful ways to
18. Another way geographic information has been included in statistical models is through
"hierarchical" or "multilevel" models. This is different from time-series-cross-sectional models
(see Stimson 1985; Dielman 1989). Instead, the idea is to use a cross-section or time-series within
each geographic unit to estimate a separate parameter. One then posits a second model with these
parameter estimates as the dependent variable varying spatially (the standard errors on each of
these coefficients are usually used as weights in the second stage). These models have been
developed most in education (see Raudenbush 1988; Raudenbush and Bryk 1986; Bryk and Thum
1988). The same problems of representing political information exist as in the previous section,
but these models have an additional problem that has not even been noticed, much less been
solved.
The problem is selection bias (see Achen 1986b), and it is probably clearest in education,
where hierarchical models are in the widest use. For example, if schools are the aggregates, the
problem is that they often choose students on the basis of expected quality, which is obviously
correlated with the dependent variable at the first stage. The result is that the coefficients on the
within-school regressions are differentially afflicted by selection bias. Much of the aggregate level
regression, then, may just explain where selection bias is worse rather than the true effects of
social class on achievement.
This problem is less severe in political data based on fixed geographic units like states
(King and Browning 1987; King 1991), but one should check for problems that could be caused
by intentional or unintentional gerrymandering.On Political Methodology 25
political science theory, formal theory will need to make more progress and
the two areas of research must also be more fully integrated.
Finally, as the field of political methodology develops, we will continue
to influence the numerous applied quantitative researchers in political science.
Our biggest influence should probably always be in emphasizing to our col-
leagues (and ourselves) the limitations of all kinds of scientific analysis. Most
of the rigorous statistical tools we use were developed to keep us from fooling
ourselves into seeing patterns or relationships where none exist. This is one
area where quantitative analysis most excels over other approaches, but, just
like those other approaches, we still need to be cautious. Anyone can provide
some evidence that he or she is right; a better approach is to try hard to show
that you are wrong and to publish only if you fail to do so. Eventually we may
have more of the latter than the former.
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